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The Danish Algerian Sea Passes, 1747-1838: 
An Example of Extraterritorial Production 
of Human Security 
Erik Gøbel  
Abstract: »Die “Algerischen Seepässe” Dänemarks, 1747-1838: Ein Beispiel 
der extraterritorialen Produktion humaner Sicherheit«. This paper discusses 
the Danish “Algerian sea passes”, 1747-1838, as an example of production of 
“Human Security”. Since the seventeenth century, privateers from the Barbary 
States (i.e. Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia, and Tripoli) had seized ships under the 
Danish flag and captured the sailors. Often they were ransomed, in the begin-
ning by family members and from 1715 by the Slave Fund in Copenhagen. Be-
ginning in 1746, however, Denmark signed peace treaties with the Barbary 
States. Thereafter Danish shipmasters would carry so-called Algerian sea 
passes which secured safe passage. The system worked well until after 1830 
when the privateering business stopped. The Danish authorities issued 28,000 
Algerian sea passes which produced specifically “Human Security” for hun-
dreds of thousands of Danish sailors. Insights into this system may challenge 
our notion of the so-called “Westphalian System”. 
Keywords: Security at sea, maritime insurance, sea pass, Slave Fund, Barbary 
States, privateering, Danish maritime history. 
Introduction 
The concept of “human security” as it was formulated in 1994 by the United 
Nations Development Report is a very visible reflection of a marked change of 
the meaning of “security” in our contemporary world.1 The older, allegedly 
narrower focus on the military security of nation-states within this field has 
been more and more relativized and the security of the individual, dubbed 
“human security”, has become the ultimate goal, at least within the discourse.2 
Whereas in the time of the Cold War, a “production of security” meant an 
easing of tensions between the blocs, nowadays an aspired “production of 
human security” can serve as justification to infringe on the sovereignty of 
nation-states.3 One of the qualitatively “new” elements is said to be the de-
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1  Human Development Report 1994. 
2  On the discourse, see: Gasper 2005. 
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territorialization of “security production”, often constructed in opposition to a 
state-based “Westphalian System”.4 
This dichotomical construction shall serve here as the starting point for an 
essay on a specific mode of “production of human security” during the Early 
Modern Era. If there was a given “Westphalian System”, in which clearly de-
fined rules and demarcations ensured stability and security5, it may be of inter-
est to look at the fringes of it in order to see more clearly its peculiarities and 
the weaknesses of such a branding. Serving as an example here is the Kingdom 
of Denmark, a medium-sized power within Early Modern Europe and the 
Northern African regencies. These were the so-called Barbary States in North-
ern Africa – Morocco, Tunisia, Tripoli, and especially Algiers, all of which 
threatened the most basic security of the Danish6 King’s subjects in two ways, 
as they both raided Danish coasts and seized Danish ships.7 Any territorially 
based mode of securing the King’s subjects was impossible since most of the 
danger lured in international waters, i.e. was extraterritorial. Therefore the 
ways in which a classical European power reacted towards this difficult and 
often unsolvable threat may give us profound insights into the underlying sys-
tems of both sides at large. In this essay the intention is to specify in detail 
what this danger meant, where it lured and how it was met. The aim of the 
following is to give a complex example of extraterritorial “production of hu-
man security” during the Early Modern Era and thereby enrich our understand-
ing of issues of security production for individuals in a time and international 
system which is perhaps too narrowly simply called “Westphalian”. 
The Threat to “Human Security” 
The Danish King’s subjects living in the islands of the North Atlantic were the 
ones most threatened by the corsairs from Northern Africa. The corsairs sent, 
from the sixteenth century, sailing expeditions to the Faroe Islands and Iceland 
among other places where they went ashore, plundered, killed, and captured 
many people whom they took as prisoners to Northern Africa. This kind of 
terror culminated in the early seventeenth century. 
They landed, for instance in 1627, in several places in Iceland and made 
more than a hundred people captives after having robbed and destroyed the 
                                                             
4  An overview and a critical examination of this idea is given in: Bacon 2001. 
5  It may be remarked that the idea of a “Westphalian” system is not very popular among 
historians, see e.g.: Duchhardt 1999. 
6  The Danish Kings ruled over Denmark, Schleswig, Holstein, Southern Sweden (until 1658), 
Norway, Faroe Islands, and Greenland, as well as small tropical colonies. In this article, 
“Danish” refers to all of these possessions. 
7  A general history of Danish shipping can be found in Degn and Gøbel 1997; Feldbæk 1997; 
and Møller 1998. A history of Danish shipping with special regard to the Barbary States, 
Algerian sea passes etc. can be found in Gøbel 1982-1983; and in Rheinheimer 2001. 
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villages. The same year Algerians killed at least thirty-four people and took 
with them as prisoners 242 inhabitants from the small island of Heimaey off 
the southern coast of Iceland.8 In 1629, they carried off thirty women from the 
settlement of Hvalba in the Faroe Islands.9 The Barbaresques also landed in 
many other places in Northwest Europe. In 1631, two Barbaresque vessels 
attacked Baltimore near Cork in Ireland where they took 111 captives, and five 
years later they went ashore just twelve miles from Bristol and took prisoners; 
thus 2,000 people were captured and carried away from that region in 1634-
1635.10 Such raids went on for a very long time, as two Tunisian ships cruised 
in 1817 near the Thames where they seized a vessel from Hamburg and another 
from Lübeck.11 
In order to prevent this odious practice the Danish King sent out men-of-war 
on several occasions. For instance the ‘Lindormen’ and the ‘Gabriel’, in 1638, 
whose commanders were instructed “to cruise diligently around the Faroe 
Islands and Iceland in order to prevent the Turks or others from molesting the 
King’s subjects”.12 Again, in 1687, a flotilla of six men-of-war was equipped in 
order to fight against the Moslems in the North Sea around Helgoland and the 
Elbe’s estuary. But of course the Mediterranean coasts of Spain, France, and 
Italy were the most endangered by raids from the nearby Barbary States. 
Another kind of threat to human security was the fact that vessels from the 
Barbary Coast often attacked Christian shipping, captured ships and cargoes 
and made the crew members prisoners in Northern Africa. This had happened 
since the Middle Ages, but as European trade and shipping increased through 
the centuries, the Barbaresque problem became more and more serious, also to 
Danish sailors, shipowners, and merchants. 
Danish shipping to the Mediterranean had been very limited before the 
eighteenth century.13 But as time went on the Barbary seizures became a sig-
nificant problem to ships under the Danish flag in the Mediterranean as well as 
in the Atlantic off North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula. 
Several Danish ships were seized and the eyewitness accounts of that time 
clearly reflect the fact that the exotic Barbaresques made up a formidable threat 
to the Christian sailors, who were unable to communicate with them and who 
were frightened by the hard fate they expected as slaves in the Barbary. 
We do have a description of such an encounter at sea.14 The ‘Jomfru Chris-
tina’, mastered by Hans Thode Gram, departed from its home port Trondheim 
on 7 September 1769 bound for Lisbon. A month later Cape Finisterre (i.e. the 
                                                             
8  Helgason 1997. 
9  Wandel 1919,1. 
10  Barnby 1970, 27-29; Field 1932, 277-282. 
11  Wandel 1919, 120. 
12  Bricka 1885-2005, 11 April 1638 and 01 April 1633. 
13  Feldbæk 1997, 232. Cf. Bang and Korst 1930, 144-145, 178-179. 
14  Moss 1773. Other accounts are e.g. Diderich 1756; and Ravn 1754; and Jacobsen 1821. 
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north-westernmost point of Spain) was sighted, and three days afterwards when 
the ship was just north of Lisbon, a vessel was sighted to the windward at 2 
o’clock in the afternoon.  
As it approached we became anxious that it might be a Turkish privateer, but 
did neither expect it to be an Algerian nor that they had declared war on Den-
mark. Therefore we had confidence in our Turkish sea pass which we had ac-
quired not long ago. As the other vessel came closer it fired a bow cannon so 
that the cannonball passed us close to our stern. We had no choice but to clew 
up our course and heave to as the wind was almost calm. When the other ves-
sel came so close that its crew was able to call us, we were ordered to come 
onboard the privateer and produce our passport15 … Our master went there by 
the ship’s boat manned by four sailors. The four stayed in the boat waiting for 
the master to return. After having waited for some time, a lot of Turks and 
Moors came down and took us onboard their vessel. We became very fright-
ened as we thought they would kill us … Thereupon the Turks took posses-
sion of our boat and rowed to our ship. Upon their approach our shipmates 
heard their strange chattering speech and became aware of the many people, 
they could not figure out what all this meant. But when they came to our ship 
it became clear that they were Turks, and they entered the ship like ravenous 
lions, chased the helmsman away, stroke our Danish colours, and sent our re-
maining six shipmates down into the ship’s boat. Some of the Turks took the 
captured sailors to their own xebec, while the rest of them took possession of 
our ship – which they considered as a lawful prize16. 
A week earlier the same privateers had succeeded in taking the ‘Rigernes 
Ønske’ of Copenhagen, so the xebec could disembark a total of twenty Danish 
prisoners in Algiers. 
This happened when Algiers had just broken the peace with Denmark, but 
under normal circumstances the Danes would be allowed to pass without hin-
drance after having produced their Algerian sea pass. 
Before the peace treaties were signed, the Danes often avoided being at-
tacked by demonstrating their will to defend themselves. This was the case, for 
instance, in 1672 near the Canary Islands when the large armed frigate, the 
‘Oldenburg’, deterred four Moslem privateers from attacking by showing all its 
cannons and handguns.17 
The Moslems were, however, not definitively illegal pirates. They consid-
ered themselves, as did their rulers, as participants in a kind of holy war against 
the infidels – and thereby qualified as privateers. A privateer (or corsair) was as 
a rule a private warship authorized by its own government by a letter of marque 
to capture enemy shipping for profit during a war and to bring their prizes 
before a prize court. Some privateering vessels were owned partly or even 
                                                             
15  Danish National Archives, Kommercekollegiet, Algiersk søpasprotokol no. 202, passport 
no. 111/1769. 
16  Moss 1773, 3-7. 
17  Henningsen 1953, 52. 
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wholly by governments or princes. Privateering was a different practice from 
pirates who would attack all vessels at all times and simply take ship, cargo, 
and crew just like that. Privateering was abolished from international maritime 
law by the Paris declaration of 1856.18 
Figure 1 
 
On 4 October 1769 the Danish ship ‘Rigernes Ønske’ of Copenhagen (in the middle) was 
seized by an Algerian settee armed with ten guns (to the right). The Danish captives were 
transferred to the Admiral’s xebec (to the left) which took them to Algiers a month later. 
Contemporary drawing by Christian Børs who was among the captivated. (Bergen Maritime 
Museum). 
 
The most important base for the privateers was Algiers, but privateering ex-
peditions were also equipped in the ports of Morocco, Tunisia, and Tripoli. The 
Strait of Gibraltar and the Sicily Channel, which are ten and one hundred-and-
forty kilometres wide respectively, were the most frequently used hunting 
grounds. 
On the other hand, the narrowness of the Strait of Gibraltar meant that in 
1796, for instance, the Danish consul Lynch in Gibraltar could send a small 
boat out west in order to warn Danish shipping entering the Mediterranean that 
the prince of Algiers had started, in spite of the peace treaty, to seize Danish 
ships. The Swedes, it can be added, warned their shipping in the same way.19 
Ships which were not bound for the Mediterranean were instructed to keep 
at safe distance from the danger. Thus the West India and Guinea Company’s 
                                                             
18  Montmorency 1976, 258-259. 
19  Danish National Archives, Board of Commerce, box 1063, Royal resolution of 23 Novem-
ber 1796; Olán 1921, 151. 
 169
commanders had orders to steer a course west of the Canary Islands so as not to 
come into sight of these islands and thereby “risk to meet the Turks who often 
cruise in those waters”; the same held true with regard to the Cape Verde Is-
lands.20 The ships’ articles of the Asiatic Company likewise stated that every-
body onboard the large India-men and China-men should be prepared to defend 
the ship against the Barbary privateers and be ready to die if necessary. Even 
the ship’s chaplain onboard the ‘Kronprinsen’ en route from Copenhagen to 
Tranquebar in India in June 1709 had to participate in preparations for defence 
when a privateer approached.21 
As a rule privateers operated first and foremost from April to October, as 
they wintered in harbour for the rest of the year, as did much European ship-
ping. Most seizures took place in the Mediterranean or within a semicircle 
within Cape Finisterre, the Azores, and the Canaries. The privateers often lay 
waiting near the ports, but sometimes they operated instead on the open sea, 
even as far away as the fishing grounds off Newfoundland. Two or three ves-
sels would operate together and normally only attack weak opponents such as 
fishing boats or other small vessels. The privateers, on the other hand, were 
characterized by being fast sailing and effective ships equipped with many 
sails, much armour, and large crews.22 
The size of the total privateering fleet is not known. But the Moroccans, for 
instance, would have as a rule a fleet of only twelve large and small vessels. 
Thus, in 1766, they had four frigates armed with sixteen to forty-five cannons 
and 130 to 330 men, three xebecs with twelve to sixteen guns and 120 to 126 
men, as well as three gallions with four to eight guns and 80 to 120 men.23 
Traditionally it has been supposed that the privateering business and slavery 
were essential elements of the economy of the Barbary States, and that the total 
number of enslaved Europeans was a little higher than one million.24 It has 
been demonstrated, however, that this was not the case,25 even though 20,000 
Christians were kept as slaves in Algeria alone between 1621 and 1627, while 
the number was a little more than 36,000 in all Barbary together in 1680.26 The 
latest estimate is that around 180,000 persons were enslaved during the golden 
days of the corsairs, namely from 1574 to 1644.27 In the eighteenth century, the 
                                                             
20  Danish National Archives, West India and Guinea Company, box 27, Instruction of 31 
October 1682, par. 11, and instruction of 08 November 1689, par. 4; box 29, Instruction of 
10 July 1697; etc. 
21  Articler 1752, 32-33; Hans Mesler’s journal. Corresponding rules, dated 18 February 1636, 
can be found with regard to other mercantile shipping, cf. Secher 1897, 656. 
22  Coindreau 1948, 99-101, 113-123. 
23  Høst 1779, 175-176.  
24  Davis 2003, 3-26.  
25  Braudel 1966, 190-212; Weiner 1979, 205. 
26  Dan 1684, 310. 
27  Panzac 2009, 137-138.  
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number of Christian slaves in Algeria had been reduced to 2,000-3,000, and in 
the early nineteenth century it was only 1,200.28 
Ransom Money 
An important purpose behind making Christian sailors captives was the possi-
bility of obtaining ransom money from their homes. Therefore, slaves were 
allowed to write home to their families or authorities and in some instances a 
few selected slaves were allowed to go home in order to give information about 
the prisoners, their harsh conditions, and the possibilities for ransoming them. 
Letters from slaves can be found scattered in Danish and German archives.29 
For very long it was up to family and friends to raise the often very large 
amounts of money necessary to ransom their loved ones from slavery. In many 
instances, nevertheless, they succeeded, often after having raised a collection in 
the churches. Severe problems remained, however, in having the money trans-
ferred safely to Africa and in seeing to it that the right persons were ransomed. 
Instead of such individual actions it was realized that it would be much more 
expedient if a more general and coordinated effort could be established. 
Through the 1620s sporadic collections of ransom money had been arranged 
by Danish authorities. But on 2 August 1630, the King and his Council decided 
that 20,000 rix-dollars should be used for ransoming Danish prisoners from the 
Barbary States. The large sum turned out, however, to be insufficient to ransom 
all slaves, so extra money still had to be collected in the early 1640s.30 
Seventy of the prisoners taken at Heimaey were still alive in Algeria in 1635 
– half of them were ransomed and came home in the summer of 1637, the rest 
never returned and we do not know their fate.31 It must be supposed, however, 
that some may have escaped, some have converted to Islam, some have been 
exchanged for Moslems captured by Christian powers, some may have been 
ransomed by other Europeans, and some have arranged for their own release.32 
In the late seventeenth century, ransom money had become ordinary alms to 
be asked for in Denmark, either by relatives of slaves or by general collections 
in the churches. In order to arouse pity in the churchgoers wooden figurines of 
sailors in chains were exhibited at the church doors.33 
                                                             
28  Bennett 1960. 
29  E.g. Rheinheimer 1999; Rheinheimer 2001; Møller 1998. 
30  Bricka 1885-2005, e.g. 2 August 1630, 12 September 1634, 22 December 1636, 18 January 
1639, and 9 March 1637; cf. Erslev 1887-1888, 230, 242-243; Braudel 1966, 209-211. 
31  Blöndal 1924, 52-72.  
32  For instance Bricka 1885-2005, 9 March 1637 and 3 January 1639. 




Algerian sea pass issued on 5 January 1781 for the ship ‘de Friede’ of Bergen, burthen 67 
lasts, commanded by Hans Ellertsen, and bound for Saint Croix in the Danish West Indies. 
The size of the parchment is 30x40 cm. It is written on the sea pass that the shipowner had 
taken his oath that vessel and cargo was Danish property. The top section was cut off along 
the wavy line. (Danish National Archives) 
 
An addition to the church collections were the small amounts of money 
which were provided by the shipmasters’ associations in Bergen and Copenha-
gen.34 From 1653 and 1707, respectively, every shipmaster and mate paid a 
small part of their wages, so-called ransom money, to help free Danish sailors 
from slavery in the Barbary States. From 1715 the money was administered by 
                                                             
34  Hassø 1934, 15, 52, 81-83, 122. 
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the Danish envoy in Brussels who had, before that, been responsible for recov-
ering Danish ships captured by European privateers.35 
At that time a number of ships under the Danish flag were seized. The large 
armoured frigate ‘St. Christopher’ from Bergen with a crew of forty men was 
taken when it was homebound from Leghorn in June 1706.36 On this occasion 
the King allowed a collection both in the churches and at peoples’ homes. The 
revenues were to be administered by the municipal authorities in Bergen to 
ransom the ship’s officers and as many ordinary sailors as possible. In August 
1708, the ‘Fortuna’ of Drammen was seized en route to Cadiz and taken to 
Algeria, and in August 1712 two more ships under Danish colours were seized 
on their way home from Portugal and Spain. Supplications from relatives to the 
King resulted in a comprehensive collection all over his realm. 
The results were not satisfactory, as all slaves could not be ransomed. For 
instance twenty-nine out of the forty men from ‘St. Christopher’ were still held 
as slaves in 1714, and had been so for eight years. 
Some prisoners, most often masters or mates, succeeded in freeing them-
selves. Sometimes they borrowed the necessary ransom money from their 
shipowners or others at home, but often these sums were so high that they 
could not meet their obligations once they had come back home and had to 
spend the rest of their lives in poverty.37 
The Slave Fund, 1715 
In 1715, the slave issue had become a matter of urgency, as more than eighty of 
the King’s subjects were held as prisoners in Algeria alone.38 The King issued 
therefore, on 12 April 1715, three ordinances.39 The first one introduced a duty 
on all shipping to France, Spain, England, Portugal, and Holland, namely three 
shillings per commercial last of burthen.40 The second ordinance decreed that 
on two Sundays every year collections should be held in all churches, after the 
pastors had aroused Christian pity in their flocks. The collected money was to 
be sent to the Slave Fund in Copenhagen which was established by the third 
ordinance. The Fund should also receive the afore-mentioned money from the 
shipmasters’ associations, which was extended, in 1716, to all ports and fixed 
at two shillings per rix-dollar for shipmasters and mates and at one for ordinary 
                                                             
35 Danish National Archives, Danske Kancelli, Indlæg til Sjællandske Tegnelser 174, 175, and 
177/1715 (box D.21-20). 
36  Møller 1998, 104; Fossen 1979, 240. 
37  Møller 1998, 108. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Fogtmann 1786-1854, 12 April 1715. – The latest survey of the history of insurance in 
Denmark is Feldbæk et al. 2007. 
40  Danish ships were measured in commercial lasts which roughly equalled a carrying capac-
ity of 2.6 tons. Cf. Møller 1974; Müller 2004, 242. 
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sailors – respectively two and one percent, that is.41 Thus, the collections con-
tributed about one half of the money in the Slave Fund, while money from 
sailors and ships made up the other half.42 (By decree of 26 November 1768, 
the duty on burthen was abolished, and afterwards only crew-members on 
vessels with an Algerian sea pass had to pay the so-called ransom money. This 
had to be paid until 1827).43 
Appointed as members of the Slave Fund Commission were a bishop and 
two competent merchants.44 The Commission had to find the best ways of 
ransoming slaves, if necessary after having consulted experts in this field. First 
of all the commissioners should ransom slaves from the Barbary States, and 
keep accounts of the Slave Fund as well as of the numbers and names of the 
ransomed slaves. The funds might be increased a little by trying to have ransom 
money paid for the Turk prisoners who were held in Copenhagen. Finally, the 
Commission was ordered to present an annual report on their activities and the 
results. 
Ordinary marine insurance was not relevant with regard to the odious prac-
tice of Moslem privateering. First, it could not be considered as piracy because 
the privateers were authorized by their governments, and second, there was no 
war declared against the North Africans. As time went on, special slave insur-
ance was developed, but it was not in common use in Scandinavia. A few 
shipmasters and mates were, nevertheless, insured in order to make sure that a 
certain amount of ransom money would be paid out.45 
Ransom money fluctuated quite a lot according to circumstances. A ship-
master cost, for example, more than an ordinary sailor, and the amounts also 
changed over time.46 During the 1630s, ransom money is known to have fluctu-
ated from less than one hundred rix-dollars to almost six hundred rix-dollars.47 
In 1714, two shipmasters ransomed themselves at 3,200 and 2,350 rix-dollars 
each. At the same time a sailor was ransomed for a little less than four hundred 
rix-dollars, but even that was a sum much larger than what an ordinary family 
could afford.48 From 1715 to 1736, the Slave Fund Commission ransomed 163 
                                                             
41  Fogtmann 1786-1854, 13 mar 1716; Schou 1777-1850, 13 March 1716. 
42  Wandel 1919, 9. 
43  Fossen 1979; Kong Friderich den Fierdes Forordninger fra Aar 1707 til 1708 1708, Co-
penhagen Shipmasters’ Association’s articles of 25 January 1707, par. 16; Schou 1777-
1850, 13 March 1716; Fogtmann 1786-1854, 12 April 1715; Forordning … over … Told, 
Consumption og Accise … 26de Novembr. Ao 1768 (Copenhagen, 1768): chapt. 21; 
Forordning om Tolden og Kiøbstad-Consumtionen … 1ste Februarii 1797 (Copenhagen, 
1797): par. 367; Schou 1777-1850, 21 August 1747. 
44  Instructions for the Slave Fund Commission can be found in Danish National Archives, 
Danske Kancelli, Sjællandske Tegnelser 177/1715 (box D.20-9). 
45  Bro-Jørgensen 1935, 157-167; Lorange 1935, 74 Söderberg 1935, 139-140, 148-151. 
46  E.g. Høst 1779, 157. 
47 Bricka 1885-2005, 4 October 1627, 2 March 1636, and 9 April 1641; Fossen 1979, 240. 
48  Møller 1998, 108. 
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Danish subjects for 154,649 rix-dollars or 949 rix-dollars on average, an aver-
age which was valid until the Slave Fund was closed down in 1754.49 When, on 
the other hand, a Danish man-of-war was lying in the roads of Algiers for in-
stance, the prices were drastically reduced. Thus, the ‘Delmenhorst’ ransomed 
prisoners at eighty rix-dollars per person in 1746, and nine years later the 
‘Fyen’ had a slave at only thirty-nine rix-dollars.50 
We do not know how many of the Danish King’s subjects were slaves in the 
Barbary States during the centuries for shorter or longer periods. Even though 
the number of seizures declined after the middle of the eighteenth century, the 
number of enslaved Danes probably amounted to thousands. We do know that 
from 1716 to 1754, the Barbary privateers seized no less than nineteen Danish 
vessels with 208 men onboard, and when the Staten van Holland, in 1682, 
ransomed 178 slaves in Algeria who had been engaged on Dutch ships, seven 
Danes were among the liberated.51 The Danish Slave Fund Commission, never-
theless, would not ransom Danish subjects who had been engaged on foreign 
vessels.52 The commissioners reported proudly, in 1736, that at that time no 
Dane was held prisoner in the Barbary States.53 
Very soon after its establishment the Slave Fund had engaged local repre-
sentatives in the financial centres of Hamburg and Amsterdam, as well as the 
merchant Johannes Pommer in Venice, from where he managed the ransoming 
business on behalf of the Danes. Between 1715 and 1753 the Fund and its 
representatives ransomed a total of 224 slaves. Before 1746 fourteen ships were 
captured and 180 slaves ransomed, i.e. on average 0.5 ships and 6.0 ransomed 
slaves per year. From 1748 to 1754 it amounted to five seized ships and 44 
ransomed seamen, i.e. on average 0.7 and 6.3 respectively per year.54 Even 
though more ships were seized and more sailors were to be ransomed, the Al-
gerian sea passes were a success as the trade and shipping activities under the 
Danish colours in the Mediterranean increased at an even higher rate, as dem-
onstrated for instance in the Sound Toll Registers.55 
It must be added briefly that many other privateers operated in European 
waters, yet without taking sailors as slaves. Especially ill-famed were the Mal-
tese Knights and the corsairs of Zeeland during the War of the Spanish Succes-
                                                             
49  Wandel 1919, 6-9; Bro-Jørgensen 1935, 161-163; cf. Lorange 1935, 74. 
50  J. J. Ihnen, Journal was auf der im Jahre 1746 von … C VI nach der mittelländischen See 
… ausgesandten … Orlog-Schiffe Delmenhorst … sich vorgetragen (copy in Danish Na-
tional Maritime Museum after manuscript in Stadtarchiv Aurich): 32; Zimmer 1927, 78. 
51  Bro-Jørgensen 1935, 157-167; Vries 1684, 160-168. 
52  Rheinheimer 2001, 29-30. 
53  Wandel 1919, 6. 
54  Bro-Jørgensen 1935, 160-164. 
55  Bang and Korst 1930. 
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sion. But by far the most seizures were done by British and French privateers 
during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.56 
Figure 3 
 
Typical pages of an Algerian sea pass protocol, 1795. The first ships’ names are ‘Anna Doro-
thea’, ‘Kron Printz Friderich’, ‘Christian Severin’, and ‘die Hoffnung’. Home ports are Co-
penhagen, Christiansand, Farsund, and Apenrade. Destinations include Saint Croix, Genoa, 
the Mediterranean, and Lisbon. (Danish National Archives). 
Treaties, 1746-1845 
All Christian seafaring nations experienced the same problems with the Bar-
bary privateers, even great maritime powers such as Britain, the Netherlands, 
and France. Even though several authors recommended common action against 
the Moslems, no such action was taken.57 So, the seafaring nations had to cope 
with the problem on an individual basis – and ended by signing peace treaties 
with the Barbary States. These, except for Morocco, were not states as such, 
however, but peripheral territories under the control of the Ottoman Empire. It 
may seem a little strange to sign a peace treaty in such cases where no war had 
been declared, but according to Islamic law there was by definition an eternal 
war going on against the Christians. 
                                                             
56  Feldbæk 1997. 
57  E.g. Project 1721; Herrmann 1815. 
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The peace treaties were as a rule made after the same pattern. The Europe-
ans promised to deliver once-and-for-all presents as well as annual presents 
typically consisting first and foremost of bullion, weapons, ammunition, and 
pretiosa. Even though this was very expensive, it was considered less expen-
sive than the alternative which would be protection by men-of-war of the mer-
chantmen in convoys, a practice which was rather slow and complicated to 
organize. 
In return for the presents the Christian mercantile shipping would not be dis-
turbed by the Moslem privateers. This would be secured by providing the mer-
chantmen with a special kind of sea passports which were cut into two pieces, 
of which the upper part was sent to the Barbary States while the large lower 
part with the text, which was in a European language, was to be carried by the 
shipmaster.58 As neither privateers nor European seamen were able to read or 
understand the spoken language of their counterparts they simply produced 
their own part of the passport – and if the parts fitted together the European 
ship should be allowed to pass on without any hindrance. The Christian seafar-
ing nations made use of individual wave lines to cut their passes.59 
Entering into a treaty with the Dey of Algiers was discussed in Denmark for 
a long time, especially after Sweden had concluded such a treaty in 1729.60 The 
Danish Slave Fund Commission gave their opinion on the matter, in 1736, and 
suggested to the King a draft which was very much like the text of the peace 
treaty which was – after futile efforts at contact in 1738 and 1742 – signed by 
Denmark and Algeria on 10 August 1746.61 
In the treaty, King Frederik the Fourth and Dey Ibrahim Pasha assure that 
they will live in peace with each other for ever, and that “all ships, be they 
small or large, should never in any way cause each other any harm or damage” 
(paragraph one);62 the ships must not delay each other (paragraph three); and 
“when an Algerian privateer meets one of His Majesty’s subjects’ ships, the 
Algerians may only approach the ship with a barge manned with two persons in 
addition to the bargemen, no more than two persons are allowed onboard the 
                                                             
58  Foreign sea passes are shown e.g. in Müller 2004, 145; Bowen 1926, 189; Granville 1924, 
32. 
59  Harboe 1839, 418; Henningsen 1970, 17. 
60  Müller 2004, 55-60; Boëthius 1922, 99-106. 
61  Holm 1897, 159-161; and Holm 1898, 204-211; Bjerg 1996; Wandel 1919, 6-11; Andersen 
2000, 37-54; Danish National Archives, Foreign Department of the German Chancery, Spe-
cial Part, Barbary States, box 1, Report of 13 October 1736 from the Slave Fund Commis-
sion. 
62  Danish National Archives, Treaty Collection, Original treaties in Turkish, Danish, and 
French; printed edition published in Danish and German as an appendix to Kong Friderich 
den Femtes Forordninger 1746 1748; abridged version in Reedtz 1826, 197-198; transla-
tion in Wandel 1919, 10-11. This treaty is identical with the treaty of 22 January 1752 with 
Tripoli, except for an insignificant difference in paragraph 9, cf. Udenrigsministeriet 1882, 
22-29. 
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Danish ship, and when the shipmaster has produced his passport they must 
leave the ship immediately, and no merchant vessel must be detained” (para-
graph four). No Dane may be “taken, sold, or made a slave” (paragraph 
twelve). Furthermore, the rights and obligations of Danish consuls and men-of-
war are acknowledged (paragraphs fifteen through eighteen). It is also agreed 
that “no Algerian ship, be it large or small, is allowed to run into sight or enter 
any port belonging to Denmark, as such might give occasion for misunder-
standings” (paragraph eight). Strangely enough, no mention of presents or 
tribute can be found in the peace treaty, but this must have been an implicit 
condition. After ratification of the treaty by the Danish King and the Divan, its 
contents were published in Denmark by proclamation of 12 January 1747.63 
The Danish treaty was verbally correspondent with the Swedish one from 
1729; only two paragraphs differ, as paragraphs eight and twelve are not to be 
found in the Swedish treaty.64 The Dutch-Algerian treaty of 18 June 1712 is 
also very much like the Danish and Swedish ones; several paragraphs have 
identical wording.65 The Dutch tradition dates back to the first treaty with Con-
stantinople in 1660, in which dispositions to many of the later provisions can 
be found. These were developed in the following treaties between the Nether-
lands and the Barbary States, culminating in the treaty with Algeria dated 30 
April 1629, the content of which is identical with the 1712 treaty.66 The French 
King signed a treaty with Algeria for the first time in 1619, the English in 
1662, and the German Kaiser in 1727.67 
The same provisions as in the Danish treaty of 1746 were reiterated almost 
unchanged in the other treaties which were signed by Denmark and the Barbary 
States: namely Tunisia on 8 December 1751, Tripoli on 22 January 1752, Mo-
rocco on 18 June 1753, the Sublime Porte in Constantinople on 14 October 
1756, Morocco again on 25 July 1767, Algeria on 16 May 1772, and Tripoli in 
1816, 1824 and 1826 – until the last Danish obligation to pay tribute was re-
pealed by treaty with Morocco dated 5 April 1845.68 
The Danish reason for signing these slightly ignominious treaties was 
mainly economic, namely the important shipping and trade under the Danish 
flag. However, we should also be aware that these treaties ensured absolute 
safety for all Danish sailors for the future. That this was also an important 
                                                             
63  Schou 1777-1850, 12 January 1747. 
64  Even though paragraph 8 in the Dutch-Algerian treaty of 26 March 1662 says that both 
Danish and Swedish sailors onboard Dutch ships might be enslaved, according to Dan 
1684, 102. 
65  Cau 1725, 449-452; a brief mention can be found in Sandbergen 1931, 155-156. 
66  Vries 1684, 19-26, 84-86, 99-103, 134-141. 
67  Reftelius 1739, 464-465. 
68  Udenrigsministeriet 1882 passim; Udenrigsministeriet 1877, passim. The most important 
Dutch follow-up treaties were from 1726, 1757, 1794, and 1816, while the Swedish were 
from 1736, 1741, 1758, 1763, and 1771. 
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reason to sign these treaties can be clearly read from the petition of the Slave 
Fund to begin peace negotiations with the Barbary States. Here not one eco-
nomic reason is stated but instead the authors elaborate on the misery of the 
Christian slaves in Northern Africa.69 However, this did not always ensure full 
security. On three occasions Barbary States violated the treaties and began to 
seize Danish ships: Algeria 1769-1772, Tripoli 1796-1797, and Tunisia 1800-
1802. Denmark reacted by sending out squadrons of fifteen, three, and eighteen 
men-of-war respectively to demonstrate naval force and strength of will, but it 
turned out to be almost impossible to force the Barbaresques. Instead the Danes 
had to accept new economic demands from the Moslems, a solution to the 
conflicts which was still much cheaper than sending out sufficient men-of-war 
to protect the Danish shipping by convoying the merchantmen.70 Thus, in the 
1790s it was estimated that the value of the tributes made up only fifteen per-
cent of the net earnings of the Mediterranean trade and shipping under the 
Danish flag.71 Considerable additional expenditures by the foreign service and 
the navy must not be forgotten, however. A very important factor in producing 
human security was the installation of Danish consuls in the Barbary States: 
1747 in Algiers, 1752 in Tunisia and Tripoli, and 1753 in Morocco.72 
Another matter for concern was the fact that not a few prisoners converted 
and abandoned their Christian faith for the sake of Islam, either for practical 
reasons or from conviction. This, in addition to the hardships of the captured 
countrymen and the need to have the sailors back to man the Danish fleet, was 
also an important driving force behind the ransoming efforts.73 
It is strange that none of the Danish treaties mention explicitly the introduc-
tion of so-called Turkish or Algerian sea passes. Probably it has been implied 
that this special kind of passport, which was already well known, should be 
made use of. This was suggested in 1736 by the Slave Fund Commission.74 
The Danish Vice Consul in Morocco could state that in the 1760s the sea 
pass system was working well. When a privateer captain was to depart he 
picked up from every consul a sea pass (i.e. upper part only) for which he had 
to make a receipt, and he even received a small gift “in order to prevent him 
from mistreating ships of those nations at sea”.75 
                                                             
69  Wandel 1919, 5-9. 
70  Andersen 2000, 184-195, 204-206; Garde 1852, 255-260, 311-326; Linvald 1923, 118-120, 
313-318. Cf. Olán 1921, 156-158. 
71  Bjerg 1996, 87. 
72  Marquard 1952, 440-458. 
73  E.g. Bishop Worm’s letter to the King 05 April 1714, in Danish National Archives, Danske 
Kancelli, Indlæg til Sjællandske Tegnelser 174, 175, and 177/1715 (box D.21-20). 
74  Wandel 1919, 6; Müller 2004, 144; Eck 1943, 190-191. 
75  Høst 1779, 179. 
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The sea pass system did provide security as is demonstrated from the fol-
lowing example.76 On 30 May 1749, a ship under the Danish colours bound for 
Marseille was seized near Cape Finisterre by a xebec from Tetuan (a Moroccan 
port just east of the Gibraltar Strait), because Denmark had not signed a peace 
treaty with Morocco. The ten Danes were taken prisoners onboard the xebec. 
The next day, however,  
our xebec met an English ship from where the shipmaster was ordered to co-
me onboard to us to show his English sea pass. When he had done that the an-
swer to him was: We have peace together. Thereupon he went back to his own 
ship again to proceed his voyage. 
The Danes were taken ashore and enslaved. 
Algerian Sea Pass Protocols, 1747-1848 
Fulfilment of the Barbaresque treaties was rather expensive for the Danish 
government, but it was considered so advantageous after all that Danish au-
thorities made every effort to secure that Algerian sea passes were not abused. 
A considerable number of regulations were published in Denmark in order to 
make sure that the authorities could supervise and control the issue of passes 
etc. 
On 1 May 1747, the royal ordinance concerning Algerian sea passes was 
given.77 It was probably inspired from two Dutch placards of 1713 and 1715, 
which together comprised the same provisions as the Danish ordinance, and 
which had their roots in the States-General’s ordinances of 1623 and 1625 
concerning Turkish sea passports. Another obvious source of inspiration was 
the Swedish ordinance of 12 January 1730, as the Danish and Swedish texts are 
very much concordant.78 
The Danish ordinance prescribed that the shipowners should take their oath 
and produce documents which proved to the municipal authorities that the ship 
belonged to subjects of the Danish King and that it was equipped at the expense 
of Danes. Furthermore, the shipmaster had to take an oath that he would not in 
any way abuse the sea pass. Only then could the Board of Commerce in Co-
penhagen issue an Algerian sea pass. It was written on a large, beautiful 
parchment form. The sea pass was valid for only one voyage, and the shipmas-
ter had to return it to the Danish authorities immediately upon his return. The 
Board of Commerce’s supervision was carried out by means of protocols, 
                                                             
76  Diderich 1756, 11-12. 
77  Danish and German text in Kong Friderich den Femtes Forordninger 1747 1748, 31-46; 
Schou 1777-1850, 1 May 1747. Cf. Andersen 1925, 301-304, 356-357. 
78  Cau 1725, 619-620; Vries 1684, 54-56, 62-63; Olán 1921, 66-68, and Müller 2004, 144-145 
(ordinance of 1730). 
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called the Algerian Sea Pass Protocols, in which information about all Algerian 
sea passes that had been issued were registered. 
Figure 4 
 
Title page of the printed version of the royal Danish ordinance of 1 May 1747 concerning 
Algerian sea passes. It is written on it that the text has been read at the town hall to the burgh-
ers present on 12 May 1747. The name of the town is unknown. (Danish National Archives) 
 
At least from March 1748, it was compulsory for all ships under the Danish 
colours destined to ports beyond Cape Finisterre to carry an Algerian sea pass. 
This held true for voyages to Spain, Portugal, all ports in the Mediterranean, as 
well as to Africa, America, and Asia.79 
The price of a sea pass was considered rather high by the shipowners. They 
had to pay fifty rix-dollars to the Slave Fund for having an Algerian sea pass 
                                                             
79  For the following, see Fogtmann 1786-1854, passim; and Schou 1777-1850, passim. Cf. 
Link 1959, 140. 
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issued, plus two rix-dollars for the form itself, and in many cases also perqui-
sites to the municipal authorities. As from 1783, payment to the Slave Fund 
was instead regulated according to the burthen of the vessel. 
When France, in 1830, conquered Algeria the situation with regard to priva-
teering in the Mediterranean changed completely, because Tunisia and Mo-
rocco also committed themselves to stopping their privateering business at 
once. Danish shipowners now wished to have the obligation to carry an Alge-
rian sea pass abolished. The Board of Commerce agreed, whereas the Africa 
Consular Directorate found that Denmark still had to respect obligations with 
regard to sea passes stipulated in the treaty with Morocco. Thus, a new Danish 
ordinance dated 9 July 1831 maintained the sea pass obligation but reduced to 
one third the fees to be paid. 
The shipowners were not satisfied and repeated their dissatisfaction, sup-
ported by the Board of Commerce. Only when it could be shown, in 1840, that 
only Sweden and to some degree Norway80 maintained the sea pass obligation 
– while it had become voluntary in Russia, England, the Netherlands, and Bel-
gium, and had been abolished in Prussia and the Hanseatic Towns – could the 
Danish Department of Foreign Affairs (which had taken over the issue after the 
Africa Consular Directorate) and the Board of Finance be persuaded, but only 
insofar as it should hereafter be voluntary for Danish shipping to take out an 
Algerian sea pass.81 The result was a royal ordinance of 1 July 1840 in accor-
dance with this cautious point of view. The year after, Sweden also adjusted its 
sea pass rules.82 
The effect came immediately. While 261 Algerian sea passes had been is-
sued in Denmark in 1839, the number was reduced to 149 in 1840, and further 
to fifty, fifteen, nine and only six in 1844. No Algerian sea pass was issued 
thereafter. 
A sea pass was, as already mentioned, only valid for one voyage. But gradu-
ally it was accepted that the ships could sail beyond Cape Finisterre from port 
to port for up to two years. Thereupon the Danish consul in a foreign port 
would renew the passport for another two years.83 This was important to the 
many ships which were engaged in the tramp trade without returning to their 
home port for years on end. But as soon as such a ship returned to domestic 
waters, the voyage was considered to be finished and the sea pass had to be 
returned to Copenhagen.84 It was decreed, however, that if this meant delay to 
                                                             
80  From 1814, Norway was no longer ruled by the Danish King. 
81  Danish National Archives, Udenrigsministeriet/Kommercekollegiet, Samlede sager til 
konsulatsjournal, file no. 440 (concerning the ordinance of 1 July 1840), file no. 233 (con-
cerning reduction of fees), file no. 772 (concerning fees for Algerian sea passes). Cf. Mar-
wedel 1938, 29. 
82  Krëuger 1856, 34-35. 
83  Schou 1777-1850, 26 February 1781. 
84  Schou 1777-1850, 3 July 1793; Fogtmann 1786-1854, 2 October 1802. 
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the shipping then the old sea pass could be renewed anywhere in the monar-
chy.85 
The Board of Commerce’s Algerian Sea Pass Protocols are preserved in the 
Danish National Archives from the period 1747-1848, but with a lacuna from 
mid-October 1771 to the end of 1777.86 
The look and layout of the registers changed over time, but the eighteen 
volumes do contain almost the same kind of information about the individual 
voyages: 1) passport’s serial number, 2) name of shipowner, 3) name of ship-
master, 4) ship’s name, 5) burthen, 6) home port, 7) destination, 8) date of oath, 
9) date of issue of sea pass, 10) date of return of sea pass, 11) name of person 
who has returned the passport, 12) any other information. At times there would 
also be information about the amount paid and whether or not the passport had 
been renewed. 
The Algerian sea pass form which was handed over to the shipmaster was 
sealed by the Board of Commerce and signed by the Board members. The 
document was in Danish and guaranteed that the ship was Danish property; 
furthermore it mentioned the ship’s name, home port, and burthen, as well as 
the destination and the shipmaster’s name. 
Research Potential 
The research potential of the Algerian Sea Pass Protocols shall not be discussed 
in detail here. Suffice it to mention that the protocols constitute an unrivalled 
source material for mapping all long-distance shipping under the Danish col-
ours in the second half of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth cen-
tury. The Algerian Sea Pass Protocols have been made use of in mapping ship-
ping to the Mediterranean (by Dan H. Andersen),87 and to Guinea and the West 
Indies (by Erik Gøbel).88 With regard to India shipping the sea pass protocols 
have just provided supplementary information compared to other sources.89 The 
completeness and reliability of information in the Algerian Sea Pass Protocols 
have been tested and confirmed in different ways.90 
Information from the Algerian Sea Pass Protocols can be used both for 
mapping general trends over time and for following shipping from a single port 
or even individual shipowners or a single master – all with regard to chronol-
ogy, number of voyages, burthens, destinations, etc. 
                                                             
85  Schou 1777-1850, 1 July 1803 and 9 April 1810. 
86  It is known that in that period too, a considerable number of Algerian sea passes were 
issued. One volume of Algerian Sea Pass Protocols has been lost. 
87  Andersen 2000, 319-330; Andersen and Voth 2000. 
88  Gøbel 1990; Gøbel 1995; Gøbel 2002. 
89  Feldbæk 1969, 248-254. Cf. Diller 1999, 79-136. 
90  Andersen 2000, 319-330; and Gøbel 1982-1983, 89-98. Cf. Henningsen 1985, 313-316. 
 183
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An example of mapping of a general trend is represented by the adjoining 
Diagram 1 which shows shipping under the Danish flag in the Mediterranean, 
1748-1806.91 
Another example is represented by Diagram 2 which demonstrates the enor-
mous importance of Mediterranean shipping compared to other long-distance 
                                                             
91  Calculated from Andersen 2000, 197, 331-332. 
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shipping, as well as the contributions by the different parts of the Danish 
King’s dominions.92 
Epilogue 
Sailors and ships were exposed to many dangers at sea. Sickness and death 
were difficult to prevent; shipwreck or general average93 were also inevitable in 
many cases, but the economic consequences could be modified by means of 
maritime insurance; privateers, or even pirates, were also a nuisance to ship-
ping. 
Privateers from the Barbary States used for centuries to be a threat to Euro-
pean shipping and to the human security of Christian sailors, including many of 
the Danish King’s subjects. The structure of the international political and 
economic system was therefore important as a decisive background or frame-
work. 
In the beginning of this article it was asked how the Kingdom of Denmark 
produced extraterritorial security against these threats from the fringe of the 
“Westphalian System”. As we have seen, it was with a mixture of measures 
that the Kingdom tried over the centuries to produce this security for Danish 
seamen. The most effective way of ensuring respect for its subjects was the 
signing of tribute-based peace treaties between Denmark and the Barbary 
States in the mid-eighteenth century. Both parties won by agreeing upon this 
system and they saw to it that the treaties were usually respected, apart from a 
few brief periods of disagreement and hostility. After 1830, the threat from the 
Barbary States faded away and the passports were no longer necessary. But 
from 1747 to 1844 the Danish authorities issued around 28,000 Algerian sea 
passes (i.e. almost 300 per year on average) which produced security for hun-
dreds of thousands of Danish sailors. 
Many peculiarities of a modern understanding of “Human Security” can be 
found in the examples presented. We find diplomacy, military intervention, 
ransoming and the payment of tributes. At the centre of all these measures was 
mostly the ultimate aim of reducing suffering of individuals. An important 
difference stands out between our modern concept and the ways of production 
of this sort of security for the individuals of the Early Modern Era, which is 
that the Danish King acted only for his own subjects and not for the individuals 
                                                             
92  Danish National Archives, Kommercekollegiet, Algierske søpasprotokoller no. 1188 
(1788), no. 1850 (1798), and no. 1852 (1806). 
93  “General average” is a term in marine insurance for the adjustment of a loss when cargo on 
board a ship belonging to one or more owners has been sacrificed for the safety of the 
whole, whereby the amount of the loss is shared by all who have shipped cargo in the ves-
sel, for instance if the deck cargo of a ship has had to be jettisoned to safeguard the ship in 
rough weather. 
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of other states. Yet, it was the individual’s security on which the emphasis was 
already placed centuries ago, not the security of the state. Both were seen as 
inextricably linked and the state was ready to devote quite substantial resources 
to reducing the threat to its subjects. In opposition to a state-centred viewpoint, 
we can clearly identify a striving towards “human security” in many actions of 
an absolute monarchy of the so-called classical “Westphalian System”.94 For 
our modern understanding it may be helpful therefore to take better into con-
sideration the “longue durée” of “human security” and to see it as a result of a 
centuries-old evolution, which can often be found or even measured throughout 
history in specific examples, of which one was presented here. 
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